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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VICTIMS HAVE STANDING TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S FEBRUARY 20, 2009 ORDER. 
T.C. and N.C. (the "Victims") brought the motion that was granted and then later 
denied, and they therefore have standing to bring this appeal. They are victims of child 
sexual abuse perpetrated by the Defendant. They appeal an order of the Third District 
Court first entered in a hearing held February 20, 2009 (and signed in written form by the 
district court on June 23 , 2009), vacating in part the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order for Victims' Treatment Costs" (R. 314-319). Neither the Victims nor the 
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") were parties to the underlying criminal 
case. This order was entered against the Victims, and no other party will raise the issues 
presented in this petition if the Victims are denied standing. Because the Victims have 
standing, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(i). 
A. The Victims have an explicit statutory basis for appeal. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 provides victims with an explicit right to appeal. 
After setting forth the trial-level tools a victim has for rights enforcement, it provides: 
[(2)](b) Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or request 
brought by a victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime 
may be appealed under the rules governing appellate actions, provided that 
an appeal may not constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile 
proceeding. 
(c) An appellate court shall review all properly presented issues, 
including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade 
review. 
1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-1 l(2)(b)-(c) (emphasis added). 
Because the Victims received an adverse ruling on their motion for DCFS to pay 
treatment costs in excess of the Defendant's ability to pay, a plain language reading of 
subsections (b) and (c) allows for the Victims to appeal.1 
This Court in State v. Lane, 2009 UT 35, %\1, 212 P.3d 529, acknowledged the 
applicability of § 77-38-11 and stated that it affords the right to appeal an adverse 
decision: "the Rights of Crime Victims Act states that a victim of a crime may appeal an 
adverse ruling in a few limited scenarios" Lane, 2009 UT 35 at ^[23. The victims in 
Lane were denied relief because they were attempting to appeal an issue that was 
precluded by the explicit language of the statute, i.e., a guilty plea. As the Victims in this 
case are appealing an order denying the payment of treatment costs by a non-party, they 
are not precluded from relief. This Court in Lane also cited the provision of the Rights of 
Crime Victims Act stating that the Act "may not be construed as creating a basis for 
dismissing any criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or 
conviction, admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for a defendant to obtain 
appellate, habeas corpus, or other relief from a judgment in any criminal or delinquency 
case." The Victims in this case are not seeking to dismiss a charge or to vacate a 
1
 The limitation at the end of section (2)(b) ("provided that an appeal may not constitute 
grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding.") is not an issue in this case as 
the criminal proceeding is complete and the defendant is already serving his sentence -
this appeal addresses only the matter of who will pay the Victims' treatment costs. 
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conviction or plea, and are not seeking any relief for the Defendant, and they are 
therefore not barred from relief under that Act as the victims in Lane were. 
In State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, [^22, 44 P.3d 756 this Court found that the plain 
meaning of these provisions indicates that a crime victim possesses the right to appeal 
rulings on motions related to their rights as a victim and that an appellate court must 
review appeals of such a nature. This Court in Lane distinguished Casey by pointing out 
that the criminal case in Casey had not been dismissed with prejudice and that the 
victim's appeal related solely to the victim's motions. Lane, 2009 UT at [^26. This 
appeal relates solely to the motion for restitution brought by the Victims; the criminal 
case was not delayed and the issue was not mooted through a dismissal with prejudice. 
B. The Victims' statutory basis for appeal is not negated by the temporary 
inadvertent removal of that basis from the Utah Code. 
Enacted in 1994, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 pertains to enforcing Utah's 
victims' rights. The statute was amended in 1995 and in 1996, each time further defining 
what methods may be used to enforce the rights. The 1996 statute, which was in effect 
until May 12, 2009, specifically afforded the right to appeal at (2)(b). 
In March of 2009, in the course of adding a provision for reconsideration of an 
adverse ruling (an expansion of victims' rights in Utah), the legislature inadvertently 
struck subsections (2)(b)-(c) which gave victims the statutory basis for appealing a 
decision that did not afford the victim his or her rights. In 2010, the legislature added 
back the subsections it had stricken the year before, noting in the legislative history: 
"General Description: This bill adds back in subsections inadvertently deleted in a 
3 
previous bill that apply to appellate rights for victims." H.B. 293, Fifty-Ninth Leg. 
(General Session, Mar. 2, 2010) (emphasis added). Furthermore, at most the inadvertent 
deletion applied only to the period from May 12, 2009 until May 11, 2010. The ruling in 
this case did not arise during that period. 
The district court issued an oral ruling from the bench in February 2009. It took 
until June for the parties agree on the language of the proposed order. Eventually both 
sides stipulated to the proposed order and it was signed by the judge on June 23, 2009. 
February's oral ruling is the controlling order in this case - the June 23, 2009 decision 
was merely putting to paper a ruling that had already been made. Since the right of appeal 
was available to victims at the time of the adverse decision in their case (February of 
2009), and since the Victims timely appealed from that order, the Victims had a statutory 
basis for appeal under Section 77-38-11. At the time of the underlying criminal act - as 
well as the time of the trial and the hearing on costs - the Victims had a clear right to 
appeal. Also, at the time of the sentencing hearing on May 28, 2008, when the district 
court ordered DCFS to pay for the Victims' uninsured, unreimbursed medical costs, and 
on August 8, 2008, when that order was memorialized in written form, the Victims had a 
~ During the committee hearing about this bill the sponsor Representative R. Curt Webb 
introduced the bill as follows: 
"We had granted victims' rights ... but had never given them remedies in the 
code. Last year we added those remedies. But in that bill, inadvertently, these 
sections were eliminated and they deal with the right of appeal of victims, and so 
we need to reinstate those rights of appeal that were inadvertently eliminated...." 
H.B. 293, hearing in House Judiciary Committee, March 1, 2010, at 4:50-5:28, 
http://le.utah.gov/~2010/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HB0293.htm (last accessed Oct. 31, 2010) 
3
 Although the order is entitled "Stipulated Amended Order re: Restitution," the facts in 
this case are unusual as it is not a judgment against a defendant that is at issue. 
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clear right to appeal. As a general rule, when adjudicating a dispute the court applies the 
version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to the suit. 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, f 12, 227 P.3d 256. 
Should the court determine that the appeal remedy is in fact not available to the 
Victims, public policy mandates that a one-time exception be granted out of fairness to 
the Victims. They are only asking for what was available, and is now available, to 
victims. There is no risk of "opening the floodgates" in granting an exception under such 
unusual circumstances as these. It would be unjust to punish the Victims 1) for doing 
what is professionally required of counsel (ensuring accurate wording in the order), and 
2) for the legislature's unintended error. 
C. The desired "payment of costs" in this case is not a "judgment" statutorily 
barred from appeal. 
The Rights of Crime Victims Act reads: "This chapter may not be construed . . . 
for a defendant to obtain appellate, habeas corpus, or other relief from a judgment in any 
criminal or delinquency case." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-38-12 (2).4 This language limits 
the relief available to ensure that protections for victims do not become tools for 
defendants. In this case, the Victims are not intending for the Defendant (or for DCFS) to 
be relieved from a judgment. While State v. Laycock points out that restitution "is part of 
a criminal sanction imposed by the state," (2009 UT 53 1[18, 214 P.3d 104), the district 
court's order that DCFS pay the Victims' treatment costs is not a criminal judgment. 
4
 The Utah Constitution's Victims Rights Amendment bars "relief from any criminal 
judgment." Utah Const, art. I, section 28 (2). The Victims are not asserting any rights 
under the amendment, so this restriction does not apply. 
5 
D. "Party" status is not required to have standing to appeal. 
A litigant whose standing is challenged on appeal must show that he or she had 
standing under the traditional test in the original proceeding before the district court. 
Soc'y for Prof I Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987). Traditional 
standing criteria requires that (a) the interests of the litigants are adverse, and (b) the 
litigants seeking relief have a legally protectable interest in the controversy. Kennecott v. 
Salt Lake Co., 702 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah 1985). 
This Court summarized appellate standing in Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist: 
Although the Utah courts have substantial discretionary authority to confer 
standing upon appropriate parties because they are not constrained by the 
case or controversy requirements contained in the federal constitution, that 
authority is not unbounded.... [I]f an appellant does not meet the traditional 
test of standing, that appellant may be granted standing if there is no more 
appropriate appellant and "the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the 
[appellant] is denied standing." In appropriate cases, this Court may even 
grant standing where the issues are of "great public importance and ought 
to be judicially resolved." 
724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) (internal citations omitted). 
Standing should be granted to these victims under traditional standing analysis 
because (a) the interests of the litigants are adverse, and (b) the litigants seeking relief 
have a legally protected interest in the controversy. The Victims have a right to 
restitution and to payment of treatment costs by DCFS if the Defendant is unable to pay. 
This interest is adverse to DCFS as it alleges funds have not been to make the payment 
and that it would be required to pay out of funds that have been budgeted elsewhere. 
Should the court not find standing under the traditional analysis, Olson authorizes 
the court to look to the second and third tests laid out in Kennecott. Id. Under the second 
6 
test, no one has a greater interest in the payment and collection of costs of treatment than 
these victims. There is no potential plaintiff who has a greater claim than these victims to 
restitution in this case or to an order that DCFS pay those costs under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-3-409. The litigation in this case has played out in such an unusual and unlikely-to-
replicate fashion that it is unlikely that another victim will have the opportunity seek an 
interpretation of the statutes in questions. If the adverse ruling stands, these specific 
victims will be completely without remedy to seek restitution. 
Lastly, under the third test, it is a matter of great public importance that the law be 
interpreted so other victims will not have to pursue the same arduous litigation path as 
these victims. While the facts and procedural history of this case are unique, 
interpretation of the statutes at issue could be useful for a great number of victims and be 
applied to a number of factual circumstances. For all those reasons, this Court should 
consider the very real needs of the Victims for the mental health treatment that they have 
received to begin to recover from the abuse committed against them by their brother, and 
for that treatment to be reimbursed as per statute. 
E. The Victims have a state constitutional right to have their rights enforced. 
Article 1, Section 28 of the Constitution of the State of Utah is the "Declaration of 
the rights of crime victims." The purpose of Section 28 is "To preserve and protect 
victims' rights to justice and due process . . ." Id. Among the rights guaranteed to victims 
by the Utah Constitution is the right "To be treated with fairness, respect and dignity . . . 
throughout the criminal justice process.v Id. The constitutional amendment granted the 
legislature the authority7 to "enforce and define" Section 28 by statute. Already in place 
7 
was UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409 (dating from 1983). The legislature defined the rights 
that were guaranteed by Section 28. Among those rights is the right to receive restitution 
for injuries or damages caused by criminal conduct. See Victims' Bill of Rights, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-37-3(l)(e) and Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-38a-302. 
The right to appeal an adverse ruling regarding restitution is implicit as a 
necessary corollary of the right to be treated fairly and with respect and dignity 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 
1981) (Congressional intent to protect rape victims would have been frustrated if victim 
were not allowed to appeal); see also In re K.P., 709 A.2d 315 (New Jersey 1997) 
(juvenile victim had standing to oppose a petition to open a sexual assault trial against 
juveniles because the victim met the established requirements for standing. 
F. The Victims have an equitable right to have their rights enforced. 
In 1987 the Utah Legislature passed the Victims' Rights Act which provides that 
the rights included in the Bill of Rights for victims must be "protected in a manner no 
less vigorous than protections afforded criminal defendants." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-
1. The Crime Victims Restitution Act provides, "If the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a 
full hearing on the issue." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(4). Refusing the Victims the 
opportunity to appeal the order, where the district court did not give the Victims a "full 
hearing" on the issues instead of accepting a self-serving affidavit from DCFS consisting 
of conclusory statements, with no opportunity for discovery or cross examination, would 
8 
not provide the Victims the equity of having their rights "protected in a manner no less 
vigorous'' than that afforded criminal defendants. 
G. The Victims do not yet qualify for extraordinary relief under Rule 65B. 
Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only becomes 
available if "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Because the Victims have standing to appeal directly under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-
11, another adequate remedy is available to them. The journalists/appellants in Soc 'y of 
ProflJournalists v. Bullock had to rely on Rule 65B because they were not "privy" to 
the case. 743 P.2d 1166 n.l. The bail bonds company in State v. Sun Surety would have 
had to rely on Rule 65B because it did not have a statutory right to appeal. 2004 UT 74 
TJ9 n. 1, 99 P.3d 818. In contrast, the Victims in this case are central to the case, they 
have rights to be involved and heard, and they have a statutory right to appeal directly, as 
discussed above. While the state needs to rely on 65B relief to appeal a restitution ruling 
(see Laycock, 2009 UT 53 f 7), victims can appeal an adverse ruling regarding their rights 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11. Extraordinary relief would only become available 
upon a holding by this Court that they do not have standing for a direct appeal. 
H. The Victims have appropriately exercised their rights through their 
father. 
In its Identification of the Parties, DCFS questions the Victims' father's ability to 
act on the Victims' behalf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-9 does not require that the district 
court explicitly approve the representation of minor victims by their parents. Instead it 
gives the court discretion to "allow the [minor] victim's parent... to act as a 
9 
representative of the victim." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-9(3)(a). The court is not 
required to designate, on the record, that a parent will represent the minor's interest. Cf. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-9(3)(b). In this case, the district court clearly allowed the 
Victims' father to act as their representative, as demonstrated by the motions and 
argument heard by the Victims' father both directly and through counsel. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
A, The district court committed plain error in not setting an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The district court erred in not setting an evidentiary hearing. However, even if the 
Victims did not adequately preserve the issue of whether the district court should have set 
an evidentiary hearing, there are exceptions to the preservation rule. "[TJhe preservation 
rule applies to every claim ... unless [the appellant] can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^[11, 10 
P.3d 346. To show plain error, an appellant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-1209 (Utah 1993). 
In the case now before this Court, the district court erred in not setting an 
evidentiary hearing, upon receiving conflicting evidence, to determine whether or not the 
legislature provided funding to DCFS for the purpose in question. The Victims 
established in their Replacement Brief that there was an error because district courts are 
10 
required to do an evidentiary hearing when there is a material factual dispute. The error 
should have been obvious because the district court had very limited information. The 
affidavit relied on by the district court in lieu of an evidentiary hearing provided no 
information to the court about which files or accounts Mr. Green reviewed for 
information, about the time range, about how extensive his review was, about what he 
meant by the phrase "for the purpose of providing therapy to victims such as" T.C. and 
N.C., or about what DCFS does when it receives an unanticipated court order. See R. 
384-385. The error should also have been obvious because the issue of whether DCFS 
was provided funding was determinative of the motions before the district court. The 
error was harmful because an evidentiary hearing would have been reasonably likely to 
result in a finding that DCFS was provided funding for such things as the Victims' 
mental health treatment. The Director's Declaration demonstrated at least a reasonable 
likelihood that further exploration would have demonstrated that funding was provided. 
See R. 476-478. The Victims' access to such information is necessarily limited, so 
fairness demands an opportunity to explore and confront the evidence, rather than relying 
on the vague Green Affidavit which did not speak directly to the issue before the district 
court and did not explain the basis for its statement about funding. 
"At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to avoid injustice." State 
v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989). It is especially important to correct the 
error of not setting an evidentiary hearing when, as here, the Victims' property rights are 
at stake. In this case, the district court had found that funds were provided to DCFS by 
the legislature, had already awarded restitution to the Victims for their out-of-pocket 
11 
treatment costs, and had ordered DCFS to pay those costs. R. 314-319. Once that 
restitution was ordered, the Victims had a constitutional property interest in it. See 
United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 427 n.6 (4th Cir. 2000). The due process of an 
evidentiary hearing is even more important when the property in question was for the 
treatment costs of child victims. Restitution is subject to the reasonable discretion of the 
district court, but the district court already exercised that discretion in ordering DCFS to 
pay, and more care was due in reversing its decision. 
B. Exceptional circumstances at the trial level make it appropriate for this 
Court to review the lack of an evidentiary hearing. 
M[T]he exceptional circumstances exception is ill-defined and applies primarily to 
rare procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n. 3. The exceptional 
circumstances exception applies in this case because the issue was one of first impression 
for the district court, the parties, the Victims, and DCFS, and because of the unique and 
possibly unprecedented procedural aspects of the case. The issue before the district court 
in this case - what to do during the post-conviction disposition phase of a criminal case 
when neither the prosecution nor the defense is actively involved in an issue of fact 
between a victim and another interested non-party - was apparently one of first 
impression for all involved. The district court had no established set of procedures, nor 
even a traditional way in a criminal case of determining the factual question of whether 
or not the legislature by its language intended to fund treatment under a statute. The 
exceptionality of that set of circumstances makes it appropriate for this Court to allow 
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later deliberation, and for this Court to provide procedural guidance to the district courts 
about how to proceed in the future in such a situation. 
C. The Victims did not invite the error of not setting an evidentiary 
hearing. 
This Court has stated that its "invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, [^15, 128 P.3d 1171 
internal quotations omitted). DCFS asserts that if the Victims considered an evidentiary 
hearing to be necessary, then the Victims should have requested an evidentiary hearing 
prior to obtaining the August 5, 2008 order that DCFS reimburse them, and that not doing 
so at that previous stage invited the district court's later error of not setting an evidentiary 
hearing before rescinding its order that DCFS pay. Aple. Repl. Br. 27-28. That assertion 
is not supported by the standards about when evidentiary hearings are appropriate. 
Evidentiary hearings should be set when there is a material factual dispute. See 
Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, Tfl9, 228 P.3d 1250. When the August 5, 2008 
order was granted, there was no factual dispute about whether the legislature had 
provided funding to DCFS for costs such as those incurred by the Victims. Part of the 
district court's findings were that DCFS had offered to pay for the Victims' treatment 
under certain conditions. R. 316-317. At that point, there was no conflicting evidence, 
so an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, and the Victims did not invite error by not 
requesting an evidentiary hearing. At the time of the February 20, 2009 hearing, when 
the district court set aside its order that DCFS pay the treatment costs, a material factual 
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dispute had been created and an evidentiary hearing should have been set. The district 
court erred in not setting an evidentiary hearing before the February 20, 2009 order, but 
did not err in not setting an evidentiary hearing before the August 5, 2008 order, so 
DCFS's assertion that the Victims invited the error is unsupported by the facts. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
STRUCK PART OF THE SPEAKER'S AFFIDAVIT AND THE ENTIRE 
DIRECTOR'S DECLARATION, RESULTING IN HARMFUL ERROR. 
A. The district court acted outside of its discretion when it struck portions of 
the Speaker's Affidavit. 
The district court's decision to strike paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Curtis affidavit 
was an abuse of discretion. The district court struck these paragraphs because it claimed 
they were conclusions of law. R. 518. However, in Cabaness v. Thomas, this Court noted 
that only "[affidavits reflecting an affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and opinions are 
inadmissible." 2010 UT 23, Tf 33, 232 P.3d 486 (emphasis added). This Court in Murdoch 
v. Springville Mun. Corp. gave examples of unsubstantiated conclusions in affidavits. In 
Murdoch the Court said that "affidavits] based on unsubstantiated belief [are] 
insufficient," "conclusory affidavits are invalid," "affidavits not based on personal 
knowledge were properly stricken," and in the case then at hand, the affidavits were 
properly stricken because "[m]any of the facts they assert are not based on personal 
knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain hearsay." 1999 UT 39, fflf 26-27, 
982 P.2d 65. In defining "conclusory affidavits" this Court held that "the plaintiffs 
statements in her affidavit are largely conclusory in form, did not state with 
specificity what words were spoken by defendant (as opposed to her own conclusions), 
14 
and therefore would not be admissible in evidence.5' Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1983). Thus, an affiant can make his or her own conclusions as long as they 
follow the rules regarding foundation and hearsay and are based on personal knowledge 
and substantiated belief. 
Following this description of what makes for improper conclusions in an affidavit, 
the stricken paragraphs of the Speaker's Affidavit should not have been excluded. Curtis 
did not include hearsay in his affidavit. He had foundation for the conclusions he came 
to in his affidavit based on his experience as a member of the Executive Appropriations 
Committee and based on the attached documents from the Office of Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst. As a result of his experience as Speaker of the House of Representatives Curtis 
had personal knowledge to back up his substantiated belief stated in the final paragraphs 
of his affidavit (not merely opinion as alleged by DCFS). Therefore, the trial court 
incorrectly struck portions of the Speaker's Affidavit as conclusions of law. Those 
portions of the affidavit were either fact, or were admissible statements of substantiated 
opinion. DCFS's claim that the Victims conceded that Curtis's statements were opinion 
is incorrect; instead, the Victims argue that either those statements are fact, or that if they 
are not fact then they are admissible statements of opinion. The Green Affidavit, which 
DCFS asserts is valid factual evidence, states that Green reviewed the DCFS budget and 
determined that there was no funding for the Victims. The Speaker's Affidavit, which 
DCFS asserts is invalid opinion evidence, made a similar review of legislative evidence 
and came to the opposite conclusion. The district court erred in striking the portion of the 
Speaker's Affidavit that corresponded to the Green Affidavit. 
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If a legislator's opinion of a statute's interpretation is in line with the statutory 
language, it can "provide evidence of Congress' intent" and can be "a helpful beginning 
point." Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); Stavros v. Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2000 UT 63, ^ j 18, 15 P.3d 1013. Neither 
case states that reliance on an individual legislator's opinion is generally improper. 
Instead, looking at an individual legislator's intent is improper when it contradicts the 
statutory language but is proper when it supports the statutory language. See id. The 
stricken portions of the Speaker's Affidavit support the statutory language they address, 
and are therefore helpful and should not have been stricken by the district court. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion when it struck the entire Director's 
Declaration. 
The trial court's decision to strike the entire Director's Declaration was also an 
abuse of its discretion. The Director's Declaration, similar to the stricken portions of the 
Speaker's Affidavit, did not contain any information that would justify its exclusion from 
evidence. Following the line of cases cited above, the Director's Declaration stated 
Patterson's own conclusions that follow the rules of evidence regarding foundation and 
hearsay, are based on personal knowledge, and are based on substantiated belief. As a 
result, his declaration should not have been stricken. Patterson, in his declaration, offers 
valuable information about how DCFS generally deals with expenditures that fall outside 
of itemized categories. His experience as the Director of DCFS qualifies him to offer this 
factual testimony. This information is important to a court that is determining whether 
"funding is provided by the Legislature for such purpose" because Patterson's experience 
16 
as the head of DCFS shows the court how the Legislature provides funding for different 
purposes. Additionally, Patterson provides the unique perspective of how the legislature 
can provide money without appropriating it for a specific and detailed purpose. For 
example, as explained in the Director's Declaration, the legislature can appropriate 
money into DCFS's general fund, which could provide for unanticipated costs, which 
would still fit the definition of being "provided by the legislature." R. 476-478. 
Trial courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence. Cabaness, 2010 
UT at %31. Some decisions, such as whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, are given more deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994). Decisions about other evidence, when there is no allegation that the 
evidence in question is unfairly prejudicial, are given slightly less discretion. See id. 
Trial courts abuse that discretion, however, when they exclude relevant evidence based 
on erroneous findings. The district court in this case found that the stricken portions of 
the Speaker's Affidavit were conclusions of law, and that the entire Director's 
Declaration was improper opinion testimony. Those findings were erroneous, so the 
decisions to exclude evidence based on those findings abused the district court's 
discretion. 
DCFS incorrectly argues that the Director's Declaration is "devoid of any 
reference to any issue before the court." Aple. Repl. Br. 31. The issue before the court 
was whether the legislature provided funding to DCFS for the payment of such costs as 
those incurred by the Victims. The Victims presented evidence in the Speaker's 
Affidavit that the legislature provided funding to DCFS. R. 436-469. The Director's 
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Declaration provided additional evidence that general funding provided to DCFS would 
be appropriate for use to pay the costs of unique court orders and of treatment for those 
similarly situated to the Victims. See R. 476-479. As the Green Affidavit did not 
provide any such detail, and provided no direction about what DCFS would or should 
normally do when faced with a unique court order involving payment, the Director's 
Declaration was a relevant and helpful link that should not have been excluded. 
C. The trial court's decision to strike portions of the Speaker's Affidavit and 
the entire Director's Declaration resulted in harmful error. 
The trial court's decision to strike the affidavits resulted in harmful error. There is 
harmful error "if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more 
favorable to [the party seeking review]." State v. White, 880 P.2d 20, 21 (Utah 1994). 
Had the trial court not stricken parts of the Speaker's Affidavit and the Director's 
Declaration, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. This likelihood 
is due to the evidence put forth about DCFS's budget, what the legislature intends for 
DCFS's appropriations, and how DCFS generally treats costs that do not fall into an 
itemized category. There is no support in the record for DCFS's assumption that, if it 
considered the excluded evidence in the Speaker's Affidavit and the Director's 
Declaration, the district court would give no weight to the stricken portions. This is 
especially apparent when compared to the lack of information in the Green Affidavit. 
The Green Affidavit contains no mention of what accounts were looked at, what funding 
period he looked at, how DCFS generally deals with an unanticipated court order, and 
whether DCFS has ever dealt with a court order under this statute. 
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The Victims do not claim that the Green Affidavit, if it had been the only evidence 
before the district court, would not have been sufficient evidence in that hypothetical 
vacuum to find that funding was not provided to DCFS for the purpose in question. 
Instead, the district court erred, in part, in striking the evidence presented by the Victims, 
both before and after the Green Affidavit was submitted, that contradict the Green 
Affidavit. The Green Affidavit was the only evidence supporting DCFS's position that 
funding was not provided, and the district court struck the contrary evidence from the 
record. The trial court's decision to strike the affidavits resulted in harmful error. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FUNDING 
FOR SERVICES TO VICTIMS SUCH AS T.C. AND N.C. WAS NOT 
PROVIDED TO DCFS 
A. The plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409(2) demonstrates 
that the Utah legislature intended DCFS to pay the treatment costs 
of victims in criminal cases without a specific appropriation. 
DCFS does not dispute that it is the "appropriate state agency," and does not 
suggest an alternate state agency that would be appropriate to pay for treatment for child 
sexual abuse victims under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409(2). See Aple. Repl. Br. 22-26; 
see also the district court's finding that DCFS is the appropriate state agency at R. 318-
319. The remaining issue about the meaning of the statute therefore concerns the phrase 
"provided ... for such purpose." The courts "give effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning." Versluis v. Gaw\ Natl Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 
1992) (citations omitted). DCFS argues that the phrase means something akin to 
"specifically and distinctly appropriated through a separate set of funds designated by 
reference to the statute in question." Such a meaning, however, is not the ordinary and 
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accepted meaning of that phrase. To achieve a meaning such as the one suggested by 
DCFS, more apt language would be "specifically designated ... for use under this 
section." "[W]e presume that the [legislature used each term advisedly." Id. 
The ordinary and accepted meaning of providing something for a purpose is to be 
the source of it, and to make it available, such that it can be used for that purpose. The 
legislature is the source of most of DCFS's funding, which it makes available to DCFS to 
use, and the legislature has done nothing to prevent DCFS from using that funding for the 
treatment costs of child sexual abuse victims in criminal cases when the defendant is 
unable to pay. Removing the phrase entirely would not result in the same meaning as 
that suggested by the Victims, as DCFS suggests {see Aple. Repl. Br. 24), but would 
instead eliminate a check on excessive awards or later changes in DCFS appropriations. 
That phrase acts as a guard against DCFS being required to pay for treatment in criminal 
cases if legislative appropriations change to no longer include treatment costs, and also 
against very large treatment costs in excess of DCFS's ability to pay. 
DCFS also asserts that the Victims' argue that the "phrase means any money 
appropriated to any agency that could be used to pay treatment costs." Aple. Repl. Br. 
23-24 (emphasis in original). This significantly overstates the Victims' position. Instead, 
the appropriate state agency must first be determined. For cases under subsection 2 of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409, the appropriate agency is DCFS. Then, any funds that 
would normally be used to pay treatment costs for victims, or funds that would normally 
be used to pay court-ordered obligations, would be appropriate for use. Because the plain 
meaning of the statute demonstrates that DCFS was provided funding by the legislature 
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for such purposes as the treatment of the Victims, the district court erred in vacating its 
order that DCFS pay those costs. 
B. The funding categories currently provided to DCFS by the 
legislature include funding for such purposes as mental health 
treatment for victims of abuse. 
As DCFS points out, "all of the money appropriated to DCFS is for the purpose of 
providing treatment to abused children." Aple. Repl. Br. 24. Thus, much of the funding 
provided to DCFS by the legislature is appropriate for use to pay the relatively small 
amount required to reimburse the Victims' out-of-pocket treatment costs. The Victims 
suggested to the district court, and detailed in their Replacement Brief, a number of 
appropriate categories for the payment of treatment costs for child abuse victims. 
DCFS specifically challenges the appropriateness of some of those categories as 
payment sources under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409(2). For example, DCFS argues that 
the Victims were not cohabitants as defined in the domestic violence statute. The 
definition of "cohabitant" in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 is problematic in cases 
involving crimes against children. The Cohabitant Abuse Act uses "the same meaning as 
in Section 78B-7-102" for its definition of cohabitant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102 
defines cohabitant as " . . . a person who is 16 years of age or older who: . . . ( f ) resides or 
has resided in the same residence as the other party." Thus the Defendant, who was 22 
years old at the time of the crimes, is clearly a cohabitant, because he had resided in the 
same residence as the Victims as their adoptive brother for years. 
The statutes contradict each other, however, about whether the Victims are also 
cohabitants. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102, the Victims are not cohabitants of 
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the Defendant because they were both under the age of 16 at the time of the crime. 
However, strict reliance on that definition of "cohabitant" renders portions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 nonsensical. As discussed above, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-
l(4)(h) includes all of the crimes in "Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4" as domestic violence 
crimes when committed by one cohabitant against another, but several of the crimes in 
Part 4 could never be committed against a cohabitant as defined by UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-7-102(2) because it is an element of the crime - including the crimes that the 
Defendant was convicted of- that the victim be under the age of 16.5 Thus, the 
legislature must have intended to define "cohabitant" relationships the same as in 78B-7-
102(2), but must not have intended to require that a cohabitant be 16 or older. 
Because the Defendant and the Victims previously resided in the same residence, 
they were cohabitants. The crimes committed by the Defendant against the Victims were 
domestic violence crimes, and the Victims are therefore eligible to have their treatment 
costs paid by the DCFS Domestic Violence Services program. 
DCFS also relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-902(l)(a) for the proposition that 
Special Needs program funds are only to be applied to children with special needs at the 
time of adoption, but the statute does not support that proposition. That statute defines 
"adoption assistance" as "direct financial subsidies and support to adoptive parents of a 
child with special needs or whose need or condition has created a barrier that would 
prevent a successful adoption." UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-902(l)(a). First, DCFS has 
5
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401, 76-5-401.1, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-
404.1. 
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not provided evidence that the definition of "adoption assistance'* guides the question of 
whether the Special Needs program would be an appropriate source to pay the Victims' 
treatment costs. Second, the Victims' parents are adoptive parents of children with 
special needs as a result of the crime, and thus they fit the definition in the statute. 
DCFS cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-202(l) to argue that the Preventative, In-
Home, and Preservation Services programs are only for children at risk of being removed 
from their homes. That statute says that those sets of services are for "any family with a 
child whose health and safety is not immediately endangered, when ... the family is in 
crisis; and ... the division determines that it is reasonable and appropriate." This Court 
could remand for a determination of the relevant facts. 
DCFS does not expressly argue on appeal that either the Facility Based Services 
category or the Minor Grants category are not appropriate categories with which to fund 
the treatment costs of child sexual abuse victims ordered in criminal cases. In addition to 
the other categories discussed above, DCFS could pay the out-of-pocket costs of the 
Victims' treatment, and the costs of the treatment of similarly situated victims, out of 
either of those categories within statutory and administrative guidelines. 
C. The legislative history of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409 demonstrates 
that the legislature did not intend to require a specific 
appropriation under the statute. 
If the phrase "provided ... for such purpose" in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-409 is 
ambiguous, reference to the legislative history of the statute is appropriate. The 
statements of the sponsor of the bill that became that statute, quoted by the Victims in 
their Replacement Brief, strongly support the Victims' argument that the phrase in 
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question is not intended to require a specific appropriation naming the statute. DCFS has 
not disputed that the bill sponsor's statements support the Victims' statements about the 
meaning of the phrase. Instead, DCFS argues that traditionally, legislative debates were 
not considered to be a good source of information about legislative intent. 
While "the traditional view ruled out consideration of legislative debates under 
any circumstance ... [t]his rule has been modified to permit consideration of explanatory 
statements by the sponsor of a bill." 2a Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction Sec. 48.13 at 604 (7th ed. 2010 Revision). The bill's sponsor, Rep. 
Skousen, was quoted in the Appellants' Replacement Brief in support of the Victims' 
assertion that the phrase in question was intended to mean that DCFS was to fund 
treatment for child sexual abuse victims from other funds generally allocated to DCFS. 
Aplt. Repl. Br. 42. Consideration by this Court of his statements to the legislature is 
therefore appropriate. His statements support the Victims' position about the meaning of 
the statute, and the district court erred in finding a different meaning. 
V. THE VICTIMS' RIGHT TO RESTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO DETERMINE AN AMOUNT OF 
COMPLETE RESTITUTION AND TO IMPOSE COURT-ORDERED 
RESTITUTION. 
DCFS concedes that, presuming jurisdiction, this case should be remanded to the 
district court to order the Defendant to pay restitution. Aple. Repl. Br. 39. Not ordering 
the Defendant to pay restitution in the February 2009 order was plain error in light of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302 mdLaycock (2009 UT 53). As discussed above, the 
Victims have standing to appeal and this Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
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This Court should remand this case to the district court with an order to determine the 
amounts of complete and court-ordered restitution. This Court should order not only that 
the Defendant pay restitution upon remand, but that DCFS should pay the restitution 
amounts resulting from mental health treatment for the Victims unless and until the 
Defendant is able to pay those costs. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate the district court's order amending the restitution order, 
renewing DCFS's obligation to pay for the unreimbursed treatment of the Victims. This 
Court should hold that the legislature provided funding to DCFS for such purposes as the 
treatment of T.C. and N.C. Alternatively, this Court should order the district court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the legislature provided funding to 
DCFS to pay for treatment such as the Victims', and should hold that the both the 
Director's Declaration, and the Speaker's Affidavit in its entirety, were admissible 
testimony that should be considered by the district court. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2010. 
Brandon Simmons Heidi M. Nestel 
Counsel for the Appellants/Victims 
^ ^ Z ^ t ^ j ^ 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of November, 2010,1 delivered the foregoing Reply 
Brief of the Appellant by hand-delivery or by first-class mail to: 
Zachariah E. Clark 
c/o Herschel P. Bullen 
1815 W. 500 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
Appellee / Defendant 
Craig L. Barlow and Laura Dupaix 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
5272 S. College Dr., Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 140814 
Murray, UT 84123 
Counsel for Appellee 
State of Utah 
